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Privatized Cybersecurity Law
Ido Kilovaty*
Tech companies have gradually and informally assumed the role of international
lawmakers on global cybersecurity issues. But while it might seem as if the international
community and Internet users are the direct beneficiaries of private tech industries’ involvement
in making law, there are many questions about this endeavor that require a thorough
examination. The end goal and risks associated with such ventures are largely obscure
and unexplored.
This Article provides an analysis of how tech companies are effectively becoming
regulators on global cybersecurity, based on states’ inability to overcome geopolitical divides on
how cyberspace ought to be regulated globally. This Article looks primarily at three separate
proposals representing the larger trend of the privatization of cybersecurity law: the Digital
Geneva Convention, the Cyber Red Cross, and the Cybersecurity Tech Accord. These, as well
as other initiatives, reflect the gradual and uncontested assimilation of private tech companies
into the machinery of international lawmaking.
This Article argues that state governments, civil society organizations, Internet users,
and other stakeholders need to step back and carefully evaluate the dangers of ceding too much
lawmaking control and authority to the private tech sector. These private actors, while not yet
on an equal footing to states, are increasingly displacing states as they seek to create their own
privatized and unaccountable version of cybersecurity law.

* Frederic Dorwart and Zedalis Family Fund Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa, College
of Law; Cybersecurity Policy Fellow, New America; Visiting Faculty Fellow, Center for Global Legal
Challenges, Yale Law School; Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. The
author wishes to thank the fellows of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, Oona
Hathaway, Claudia Haupt, Tiffany Li, Mason Marks, Frank Pasquale, Bob Spoo, and Ari Ezra Waldman
for their feedback and the editors at UC Irvine Law Review for their extraordinary editorial work.
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INTRODUCTION
The global regulation of cybersecurity is one of the most contentious topics
on the international legal plane.1 States, which are perceived as the most suitable
entities to regulate cyberspace globally, are largely incapable of reaching a consensus
on what such law would look like due to their geopolitical differences.2 In this

1. David P. Fidler, The UN Secretary-General’s Call for Regulating Cyberwar Raises More
Questions than Answers, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/unsecretary-generals-call-regulating-cyberwar-raises-more-questions-answers [ https://perma.cc/63XS429C ] (“How these [international law] rules apply in cyberspace has been extensively discussed across
the UN and elsewhere for many years, often with controversy overshadowing consensus.”).
2. JACK GOLDSMITH, CYBERSECURITY TREATIES: A SKEPTICAL VIEW 4 (2011) (“For most
cybersecurity issues, it is not clear that a mutually beneficial deal is possible in theory . . . . [T]here are
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structural and normative vacuum, tech companies are seizing the opportunity to
create norms and rules for cyber operations, essentially creating a privatized version
of cybersecurity law.3
This “governmentalization” of private tech companies is occurring in many
contexts that were previously government-regulated.4 For example, many tech
companies have recently begun to perform a quasi-judicial function within their
platforms.5 Amazon is but one example of a company where judicial functions are
privatized through the widely used dispute resolution system between vendors and
consumers.6 Facebook’s “Supreme Court” is another instance of a tech company
deciding to make certain quasi-judicial determinations on content moderation,
reflecting the overall trend of governmentalization in tech.7
Tech companies’ desire for power through governmentalization is also
currently reshaping the international legal regulation of cybersecurity. By
international legal regulation of cybersecurity, I mean the international law
applicable to cyberspace, as the “fifth domain” of warfare,8 where state
governments and non-state actors are acting in offense and defense, and civilians
are victimized by cyber operations. In this domain, Microsoft is leading the charge
in creating norms that would govern the law applicable to global cybersecurity,9 a
deep and fundamental clashes not only over what practices should be outlawed but also and more
broadly over what the problem is.”); Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State
Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 640–41 (2018) (“For a variety of reasons,
however, a constitutive cybersecurity treaty may not be possible, especially if it attempts to regulate
state conduct. At the most basic level, there are few cyber-related subjects that permit mutually
beneficial deals for states with differing technological capabilities, differing vulnerabilities, and differing
beliefs about the appropriate amount of governmental control over the internet or the dangers posed
by free speech. Indeed, not only do states desire to regulate different activities in cyberspace, many
states see others’ proposed norms as being antithetical to their own concerns.”).
3. See Shin-yi Peng, “Private” Cybersecurity Standards? Cyberspace Governance,
Multistakeholderism, and the (Ir)relevance of the TBT Regime, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 445, 450 (2018)
(arguing that “privatization of governance” is a result of “governments’ lack of requisite technical
expertise and the flexibility to deal with ever-more complex regulatory tasks”).
4. See Janosik Herder, The Power of Platforms, P UB . S EMINAR (Jan. 25, 2019), https://
publicseminar.org/essays/the-power-of-platforms/ [ https://perma.cc/5HT6-NGAB ].
5. Frank Pasquale, Digital Capitalism—How to Tame the Platform Juggernauts, WISO DIREKT
( June 2018), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/14444.pdf [ https://perma.cc/49DG-TWE3 ]; see also
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1617 (2018).
6. Pasquale, supra note 5, at 2–3; Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of
Amazon as Private Global Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 201–03 (2016)
(explaining how platforms, Amazon in particular, are governors with respect to dispute resolution
between consumers and vendors).
7. Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s Supreme Court Work, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html
[ https://perma.cc/F7VP-CPKT ].
8. War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST ( July 1, 2010), https://www.economist.com/briefing/
2010/07/01/war-in-the-fifth-domain [ https://perma.cc/C67T-W3JM ].
9. Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/ [ https://
perma.cc/9NN6-7SGM ]. For a summary of how Microsoft’s endeavors fit in with in the broader
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phenomenon some refer to as norm entrepreneurship.10 These norms are the
binding directives that seek to protect Internet users from state-sponsored
cyberattacks and strengthen their cybersecurity protection.11
There are many good reasons for Microsoft to take the lead in developing such
norms. The primary explanation is that Internet users are vulnerable, and their
vulnerability, particularly to state-sponsored activity online, negatively impacts the
reputation of and trust in the tech industry.12 After all, Internet users in such cases
could see their personal information compromised,13 access to banking and
emergency services curtailed,14 or devices such as vehicles,15 pacemakers,16
webcams,17 and insulin pumps hacked.18 These are all real and documented

picture of private-sector cyber norms, see ANGELA MCKAY ET AL., MICROSOFT, INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY NORMS: REDUCING CONFLICT IN AN INTERNET-DEPENDENT WORLD (2014),
http://aka.ms/cybernorms [ https://perma.cc/4R6E-RBPA ]; Garrett Hinck, Private-Sector Initiatives
for Cyber Norms: A Summary, LAWFARE ( June 25, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/private-sectorinitiatives-cyber-norms-summary [ https://perma.cc/P83B-H65M ].
10. Tim Maurer, Private Companies Take the Lead on Cyber Security, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May
4, 2018), https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/private-companies-take-the-lead-on-cyber-security/
[ https://perma.cc/5S3F-BKCF ]; see also Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Norms for Global
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 425, 447 (2016) (“Norm entrepreneurs are critical to norm emergence
not only because they call attention to an issue but because they frame it—they use language that names,
interprets, and dramatizes the problem—and on that basis propose a norm to address it.”).
11. Brad Smith, 34 Companies Stand Up for Cybersecurity with Tech Accord, MICROSOFT
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/04/17/34-companies-stand-upfor-cybersecurity-with-a-tech-accord/ [ https://perma.cc/FP8T-98PJ ] (introducing the four governing
principles of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord).
12. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 502–03 (2017)
(listing the incentives for the tech industry to pursue public-private partnerships in global cybersecurity,
including that “the public-relations benefits of some of the actions are substantial,” for example,
“attributing cyber intrusions to state-sponsored attackers is excellent advertising”).
13. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 987 (2018) (“A day rarely
passes without another report of a major cybersecurity incident. Hackers routinely breach the systems
of retailers, stealing consumer credit card data, social security numbers, and other valuable
personal information.”).
14. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21,
2007, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ [ https://perma.cc/RKZ9-DHGZ ]
(describing cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 that disabled access to banking, emergency, and
government services).
15. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED ( July
21, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
[ https://perma.cc/4FHN-HDKK ].
16. Lily Hay Newman, A New Pacemaker Hack Puts Malware Directly on the Device, WIRED
(Aug. 9, 2018, 12:30 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/pacemaker-hack-malware-black-hat/
[ https://perma.cc/EA5Q-NJEV ].
17. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How 1.5 Million Connected Cameras Were Hijacked to Make
an Unprecedented Botnet, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 29, 2016, 9:03 AM), https://www.vice.com
/en_us/article/8q8dab/15-million-connected-cameras-ddos-botnet-brian-krebs [ https://perma.cc/
BE7R-P5WD ].
18. Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Hacking, REUTERS
(Oct. 4, 2016, 4:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumpse/jj-warns-diabetic-patients-insulin-pump-vulnerable-to-hacking-idUSKCN12411L [ https://perma.cc
/5HCU-GEFA ].
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consequences of malicious cyberspace activity. With these potentially devastating
consequences in mind, it is understandable why the next logical step would be to
develop binding norms and rules to effectively deter such activity.19
But there is a caveat, which is that private tech companies are de facto
becoming the legislators of global cybersecurity law, with no guarantee of respect
for values such as accountability,20 transparency, or fairness.21 And while the norms
proposed by these companies may sound innocuous22—involving terms such as
“peace,”23 “humanitarian,”24 and “Red Cross”25—a closer look reveals their
potential difficulties.
This Article argues that private tech companies are effectively becoming
legislators of global cybersecurity law, with strings attached. This argument is
grounded in the premise that states have failed to respond to this normative vacuum
and are currently unable to do so.26 Accordingly, as Julie Cohen has recently argued,
“dominant platforms’ role in the international legal order increasingly resembles that
of sovereign states.”27 Tech companies’ increasing involvement in the international
legal system is challenging its structure, values, and future.
Some would contest the premise that states are unable or unwilling to regulate
global cybersecurity. They claim that the international legal order, through
long-standing principles and frameworks, already provides civilians a variety of

19. Joseph Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace, 41 INT’L SECURITY 44, 60 (2017) (“A
fourth mechanism by which dissuasion works is norms and taboos. Normative considerations can deter
actions by imposing reputational costs that can damage an actor’s soft power beyond the value gained
from a given attack.”).
20. Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101, 117
(2011) (“Privatization has become a dominant reality of twenty-first-century governance. Accordingly,
scholars and policymakers will need to seek new ways to embed core principles of accountability into
this emerging form of state power.”).
21. Eichensehr, supra note 12 (providing an in-depth analysis of the public law values implicated
by public-private partnerships in cybersecurity).
22. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 201 (2017)
(arguing that platforms who self-identify as “conscientious, neutral stewards of the global digital
infrastructure, set a lofty tone that elevates the more self-interested processes of strategic positioning
operating continually in the background”).
23. Demand Digital Peace Now, MICROSOFT, https://digitalpeace.microsoft.com/ [ https://
perma.cc/B588-TME6 ].
24. Brad Smith, We Need to Modernize International Agreements to Create a Safer Digital World,
MICROSOFT
(Nov. 10, 2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/11/10/needmodernize-international-agreements-create-safer-digital-world/ [ https://perma.cc/CYB9-Z6GN ].
25. Smith, supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s
Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY ( June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/
[ https://perma.cc/
5VCG-6F92 ].
27. Cohen, supra note 22, at 199–203 (providing various examples of platforms independently
engaging in institutional and legal reform, and observing that “the role of platforms in the emergent
global legal order is doubly under construction”).
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protections from state-sponsored cyberattacks.28 Indeed, international law does
protect civilians from government overreach in assorted ways under the auspices of
international human rights law.29 These include their rights to life,30 due process,31
privacy,32 assembly,33 speech,34 access to information,35 and even basic access to the
Internet itself.36 Directing state-sponsored cyberattacks at civilians, depending on
their effects, could potentially be in violation of these human rights obligations.37
Additionally, once an armed conflict emerges, international humanitarian law offers
its own set of protections with the aim of reducing the suffering and adverse
consequences that are so endemic to war.38 For example, international humanitarian
law prohibits the direct targeting of civilians by warring parties.39 Today, this reflects

28. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3
(2012) (“Yes, international law principles do apply in cyberspace. . . . [N]o. Cyberspace is not a
‘law-free’ zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraint.”).
29. Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill Human
Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 505 (2016) (“At the emergence of
international human rights, it was anticipated that its principles would extend to all media, regardless of
new technological advancements.”).
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174–75 [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
31. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175–76; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 10.
32. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 17(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177–78; UDHR, supra note 30, at
art. 12.
33. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 21, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 20(1).
34. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 19.
35. ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; UDHR, supra note 30, at art. 19.
36. Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20 ( June 27, 2016); David
Kravets, U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED ( June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2011/06/internet-a-human-right/ [ https://perma.cc/22CA-JK89 ] (“The
Special Rapporteur calls upon all states to ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times, including
during times of political unrest. In particular, the Special Rapporteur urges States to repeal or amend
existing intellectual copyright laws which permit users to be disconnected from Internet access, and to
refrain from adopting such laws.”).
37. Some, however, would argue that the application of international human rights law to a
cyberattack against civilians originating from abroad is not as straightforward. See Cordula Droege, Get
Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 533, 547 (2012) (“[I]nternational human rights law might apply, but would a computer
network attack, conducted from the other side of the globe against civilian infrastructure, fulfil the
requirement of effective control for the purpose of applicability of human rights law? Also, to what
extent would human rights law provide sufficient protection against the disruption of infrastructure the
effects of which on the lives of civilians is not necessarily immediately identifiable?”).
38. Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, INT’L
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 30, 1998), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc
/57jm93.htm [ https://perma.cc/V3VX-ELXJ ] (“[I]nternational rules which limit the effects of war
on people and property, and which protect certain particularly vulnerable groups of persons. That is
the goal of international humanitarian law, with the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
as its main expression and an important body of customary law as a decisive supplementary source
of law.”).
39. Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1 [ https://perma.cc/
6V8Z-ZGMN ] (“The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
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indisputable and binding customary international law.40 By analogy, civilians ought
to be protected from direct cyberattacks, as they are not directly involved in the
conflict and therefore are not legitimate military objectives.41 Similarly, the same
body of law restricts indirect harm to civilians by limiting the amount of permissible
collateral damage involving civilians and their property.42 It may therefore appear as
if, at least in theory, there is sufficient law applicable to state-sponsored cyberattacks.43
While these assessments appear straightforward and backed by long-standing
practice,44 emerging state activity—and most importantly the tech industry’s activity
in cyberspace—makes these case-by-case assessments far more complicated than
they may seem at first blush.45 Some questions that remain unresolved are: What
does it mean to directly target a civilian using malware that is inherently indirect?46
Does such targeting need to be lethal? Or would directly disabling civilian computer
systems and networks also constitute a violation of that rule? Does collateral damage
only mean deaths and injuries to civilians? Or does it include other harms, such as
data loss, denial of service, manipulation, spread of fear and terror, and major
inconvenience?47 Would election interference be in violation of international human

combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed
against civilians.”).
40. Id. (“State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”).
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“The civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”).
42. Id. art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (“[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”).
43. See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817
(2012) (detailing the various international law rules applicable to cyberattacks).
44. Gary Brown & Keira Poellet, The Customary International Law of Cyberspace, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q., Fall 2012, at 127 (“There is a body of customary law reflecting the extensive and virtually
uniform conduct of nation-states during traditional warfare that is widely accepted and well
understood—the law of war. Unfortunately, the application of the law of war to cyberspace is
problematic because the actions and effects available to nations and nonstate actors in cyberspace do
not necessarily match up neatly with the principles governing armed conflict.”).
45. Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L
L. ONLINE 1 (2017) (identifying specific gaps in international law as it applies to cyberattacks).
46. Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525,
567–68 (2012) (“However, there are cyber attacks that deliberately target objects to kill civilians or
destroy civilian objects. Such attacks are clearly unlawful under the law of armed conflict. In practice,
however, cyber attacks targeting civilians have been more of an inconvenience than a threat to life
or safety.”).
47. Ido Kilovaty, Virtual Violence—Disruptive Cyberspace Operations as “Attacks” under
International Humanitarian Law, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 113, 137–39 (2016) (“The
primary shortcoming of a narrow reading of collateral damage is that the most severe disruptive cyber
operations would be far more humanitarianly dangerous than physical destroying a house belonging to
a civilian. That is to say, that disruption effects can be far more serious than physical ones. In that sense,
reconsidering the scope of collateral damage is essential.”).
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rights law?48 Or would dated conceptions of sovereignty and prohibited
intervention limit such a determination? International law seems unable to answer
these with a reasonable degree of specificity.
These questions are far from theoretical. In fact, they represent a significant
gap in international law that is not easily solvable. This indeterminacy poses a serious
and immediate danger to civilians who find themselves in the midst of a cyber
conflict. Tech companies that promote “norms,” “rules,” and “principles” for
global cybersecurity realize that this point in time is an opportunity for them to seize
the role of international lawmakers.49 Clearly, private entities have no authority to
create “law” as that term is typically understood within the U.S. constitutional
system. But internationally, tech companies may be able to create certain
prescriptions that will affect state practice and eventually permeate legal systems,
becoming authoritative without being grounded in the democratic legitimacy, public
interest, or accountability expected from “real” legislators.50 This is largely enabled
through customary international law—states’ repeated practices that create a sense
of binding legal obligation.51
This represents a departure from the state-centric approach of creating
international law, a phenomenon which this Article calls the privatization of

48. Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International
Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2017) (“[I]t would seem as if Russia’s cyber intrusion violated the
human rights of the owners of the various e-mail accounts, including John Podesta and several
DNC officials.”).
49. Maurer, supra note 10 (“[I]t is only the latest sign that what norms govern cyber space and
the global governance of cyber security—or, rather, the lack thereof—have captured the attention of
corporate boardrooms around the world.”).
50. The term “real legislators” is somewhat elusive in the international legal context. Many have
argued that non-state actors may be influencing international law in a variety of ways, a so-called
“bottom-up” approach. See Jon P. Jurich, Cyberwar and Customary International Law: The Potential of a
“Bottom-up” Approach to an International Law of Information Operations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 275 (2008);
Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance
Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, Beyond
State-Centrism: International Law and Non-State Actors in Cyberspace, 21 J. CONF. & SECURITY
L. 595 (2017). In the privacy law context, see Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97
Wash. U. L. Rev. 773, 790–92 (2020) (describing the process of legal endogeneity—how privacy law is
understood by corporations as a matter of compliance rather than a set of substantive privacy protections).
51. Customary International Law, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE: WEX, https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law [ https://perma.cc/ZE3T-RHNL ] ( last visited
Dec. 14, 2019 ) (“Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established
international practices, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written conventions and treaties.
Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation.”).
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cybersecurity law.52 This Article explores this new phenomenon53 while describing
the trends that are currently reshaping the international legal order on cybersecurity.
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify potential structural and normative
difficulties arising from the tech industry’s growing involvement in international
lawmaking. These difficulties should encourage states, civil society, and the public
to step back and reexamine the privatization of cybersecurity law. Part I introduces
the narrative of the emerging privatization of cybersecurity law led by the tech
industry. Part II delves into how this phenomenon challenges and disrupts the
international legal order, potentially heralding an important transformation of the
basic tenets of international law. Part III explores the concrete ways in which the
privatization of cybersecurity law is undermining norms and values such as
democracy, transparency, accountability, and neutrality. In closing, I conclude with
a call for caution with respect to the increasing regulatory role of private tech
companies and a reconsideration of international law’s effort to regulate
cybersecurity globally.
I. PRIVATIZED CYBERSECURITY LAW
Privatized cybersecurity law is the emerging phenomenon of tech companies
creating rules, norms, and principles for conduct in cyberspace, primarily the
conduct of states vis-à-vis other states and individual users.54 Private tech
companies, for many reasons that this Article will cover, hold the view that it is their
duty to protect civilians in cyberspace, whether proactively from state-sponsored
cyberattacks or passively by enhancing civilian infrastructure security.55 While

52. “Privatization” in that context does not necessarily pass any moral judgement on platforms’
endeavors to create global cybersecurity law. While this Article is generally critical of these steps, there
are many other contexts where privatization of cybersecurity may actually be beneficial. See, e.g., Nathan
Alexander Sales, Privatizing Cybersecurity, 65 UCLA L. REV. 620, 687–88 (2018) (looking at various
market-based solutions to incentivize black-hat and gray-hat hackers to sell their vulnerabilities on the
white-hat market; the author, while recognizing the benefits of the private sector in promoting
cybersecurity, is nonetheless cautious, arguing “[t]here’s no question that the government has a critical
role to play—indeed, the leading role—in securing cyberspace, whether through traditional means like
law enforcement or through less conventional regulatory approaches”).
53. In contrast, non-state actors have already been involved in influencing the outcomes of
political and diplomatic negotiations. See Alex Grigsby, The End of Cyber Norms, 59 GLOBAL
POL. & STRATEGY 109, 109 (2017) (“Think tanks, foundations and some technology companies joined
in as norm entrepreneurs, hoping to make their mark on diplomatic negotiations.”). However, the
phenomenon introduced by this Article—lawmaking by digital platforms—is different.
54. See A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, MICROSOFT, https://query.prod.
cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW67QH [ https://perma.cc/8WAW-CC9P ].
55. Among the Cybersecurity Tech Accord’s commitments is one to “protect all of our users
and customers everywhere,” which focuses on active protection “from cyberattacks—whether an
individual, organization or government—irrespective of their technical acumen, culture or location, or
the motives of the attacker, whether criminal or geopolitical” and a more passive protection where
companies promise that they “will design, develop, and deliver products and services that prioritize
security, privacy, integrity and reliability, and in turn reduce the likelihood, frequency, exploitability, and
severity of vulnerabilities.” Id.

First to Printer_Kilovaty.docx (Do Not Delete)

1190

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/28/20 8:13 PM

[Vol. 10:1181

seemingly innocuous, this involves a considerable acquisition of prescriptive power
by tech companies, which this Part analyzes and reviews.
In 2017, Brad Smith, President and Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft, gave a
provocative speech at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland.56 Smith’s talk
started with an overview of the creation of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the world’s most central and active humanitarian institution. Henry
Dunant, a Swiss businessman, established the ICRC in 1863 after witnessing the
horrors of war at the Battle of Solferino in June 1859, when thousands of soldiers
lost their lives or were severely injured.57 While the atrocities of war were
undoubtedly Dunant’s motivation in convincing governments to support the
creation of the ICRC, according to Smith, it was also the new technologies of
warfare that led Dunant and others to rethink the limits and the humanitarian
aspects of waging war between nations.58 These new technologies directly caused
massive atrocities, suffering, and casualties that convinced Dunant that an
international humanitarian organization was urgently needed.59
Smith argued that we are at a similar moment in history, where cyberspace is
the catalyst for a new arms race.60 That arms race is leading to the creation of cyber
weapons in an almost legally and ethically unrestricted manner, which leaves
civilians vulnerable to severe harm and suffering. Smith, therefore, is of the view
that he is in a similar position as Dunant, in that the tech industry, witnessing the
horrors of global cyberattacks, should create its own version of an ICRC for
cyberspace—a Cyber Red Cross (CRC) of sorts. While Smith’s motivations may be
genuine, this view represents a significant shift in the tech industry’s view of its own
role in society.
To demonstrate the humanitarian harms of cyberattacks, Smith provided the
recent example of the WannaCry ransomware.61 In May 2017, the malware
WannaCry affected as many as 200,000 computers in 150 nations around the
56. Brad Smith Takes His Call for a Digital Geneva Convention to the United Nations,
MICROSOFT (Nov. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Brad Smith Takes His Call], https://blogs.microsoft.com/onthe-issues/2017/11/09/brad-smith-takes-call-digital-geneva-convention-united-nations/
[ https://
perma.cc/5634-5JU2 ].
57. Henry Dunant (1828–1910), INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Apr. 6, 1998), https://
www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jnvq.htm [ https://perma.cc/X9LR-X85S ].
58. Brad Smith Takes His Call, supra note 56.
59. Brad Smith & Carol Ann Browne, What’s to Be Learned from the Founding of the Red Cross?,
MICROSOFT, https://blogs.microsoft.com/today-in-tech/whats-to-be-learned-from-the-founding-ofthe-red-cross/ [ https://perma.cc/K5AV-YDJW ] (“Across Europe a consensus quickly emerged that
these technological advances for warfare required new humanitarian and organizational innovations
in response.”).
60. Steve Ranger, Why Microsoft Is Fighting to Stop a Cyber World War, ZDNET (Dec. 12,
2018),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/why-microsoft-is-fighting-to-stop-a-cyber-world-war/
[ https://perma.cc/NAL5-EZB5 ] (“Smith drew a parallel between the run-up to the First World War
and the burgeoning cyberwar arms race today.”).
61. Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries Exploiting Stolen
N.S.A. Tool, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uknational-health-service-cyberattack.html?module=inline [ https://perma.cc/P996-U7UE ].
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world.62 This was not a military-to-military kind of cyberattack, but rather an
indiscriminate ransomware worm that infected any computer it touched.63 Most
notably, as many as 70,000 computers belonging to the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service hospital network were severely affected.64 Smith’s concerns, shared
with many others around the world, are that cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure
could result in significant humanitarian consequences, and that the law is largely
silent on the matter.
Skeptics would argue that it was computers, not people, that were targeted and
affected by the WannaCry ransomware. Therefore, what exactly is the humanitarian
concern? This view could not be further from the truth. The adverse effects on
medical computers and devices affected 7,000 patients scheduled to receive medical
treatment on the day of WannaCry’s mayhem.65 Because computers have created
mediated environments in which humans need computers to literally sustain life,
attacks against computers will have clear and direct effects on human lives and
well-being.66 Cyberattacks, therefore, may have serious consequences for civilians,
who rely on governments, businesses, critical infrastructure, transport, energy, and
other individuals who themselves rely on the integrity and availability of computer
systems and networks.67
Microsoft and many other tech companies clearly have a stake in promoting
“peace” in cyberspace.68 No business would want the government to use its
infrastructure to engage in cyber conflict, especially if such engagement did not
directly benefit their revenue, could negatively affect user trust, and was not

62. Elizabeth Piper, Cyber Attack Hits 200,000 in at Least 150 Countries: Europol, REUTERS
(May 14, 2017, 3:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-europol/cyber-attack-hits200000-in-at-least-150-countries-europol-idUSKCN18A0FX [ https://perma.cc/8THY-TSJ3 ].
63. Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry
Malware Attack to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/
[ https://perma.cc/V4TL-6KBF ] (“In May of this year, a dangerous cyberattack known as WannaCry
spread rapidly and indiscriminately across the world.”).
64. Sarah Neville, NHS Systems to Be Strengthened After Cyber Attack, FIN. TIMES ( July 12,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ced6dd82-6709-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe [ https://perma.cc/
YY6P-YGMV ].
65. David Benady, Cybersecurity: Have Lessons Been Learned Since the WannaCry Attack?,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/delivering-digital-transformation/2018/
nov/29/cybersecurity-have-lessons-been-learned-since-the-wannacry-attack
[ https://perma.cc/
YEW6-YWQ6 ] (“Over a third of trusts and nearly 600 doctors’ surgeries were hit by the virus, resulting
in almost 7,000 patient appointments being cancelled.”).
66. Tyler Elliot Bettilyon, Cybersecurity Is About Much More than Hacking, MEDIUM (Nov. 21,
2018), https://medium.com/s/story/cybersecurity-isnt-just-about-hacks-f11c7ad07660 [ https://
perma.cc/X45F-CAES ] (“Digital systems now play a crucial role in banking, payroll, distribution
chains, voting, social interaction, medicine, cars, planes, trains, implanted medical devices, and so on.
Each and every one of these digital systems is a potential vulnerability.”).
67. Id.
68. Ed Targett, Microsoft Demands “Digital Peace”—What Does It Really Want?, COMPUTER
BUS. REV. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cbronline.com/news/digital-peace-microsoft [ https://
perma.cc/N8JE-AVAH ].
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imposed coercively by regulators.69 And even if it did benefit the tech company’s
profits, users’ trust would be severely impacted.70 Users are unlikely to approve of
becoming pawns in conflicts between states, particularly if such conflicts are
mediated by private tech companies. Tech companies themselves certainly do not
want to perpetuate such a reality. Smith made this clear in his speech by highlighting
how cyber warfare between nations is in fact an attack on civilians. He said,
When there are attacks on cyberspace, they in fact are attacks on private
property—it may be against the phone that is in your pocket, or the laptop
that is on your desk, or the servers that are in our datacenter, or the cables
that are underneath the ocean, that we operate, that connect datacenters
together.71
The concerns put forward by Smith illustrate the reason why many tech
companies believe that their duty to their users involves strengthening their
products’ cybersecurity—whether devices, software, or any other service on which
civilians rely. By doing so, companies may make it harder for malicious actors to
attack civilians, directly or indirectly, or at least increase the costs of such attacks to
the point where malicious actors would become disincentivized from attacking
civilians.72 Tech companies not only passively protect their users by repelling
malware and patching their products, but are also currently using the law and courts
to proactively defend them by going after malicious actors before users are
massively victimized by cyberattacks.73 This is an example of the fairly
well-established idea of a public-private partnership on certain national security and
69. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 691 (2019) (“One
possible explanation for the companies’ behavior is economic: the companies may assess that the
posture of neutrality will best maximize their growth and profits going forward by increasing their
appeal to users worldwide.”).
70. See id. at 668, 683 (“They have global users, not just customers or shareholders . . . . [These]
users rely on the company for services and trust the company to keep potentially sensitive information
secure . . . . Unlike companies that merely sell goods to customers, the tech companies’ relationship to
their users is more intimate, more expansive, and more constant than even a series of
recurring transactions.”).
71. Brad Smith Takes His Call, supra note 56.
72. Daniel J. Solove, Cybersecurity: Leviathan vs. Low-Hanging Fruit, TEACH PRIVACY ( June
24, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/cybersecurity-leviathan-vs-low-hanging-fruit [ https://perma.cc/
B8ZF-AMMD ] (“There are certainly many hackers with sophisticated technical skills and potent
malicious technologies. These threats can seem akin to Leviathan—all powerful and insurmountable.
It can be easy to get caught up focusing on the Leviathan and miss the low-hanging fruit of
cybersecurity. This low-hanging fruit consists of rather simple and easy-to-fix vulnerabilities and bad
practices. Cybersecurity is a garden of mostly low-hanging fruit. Pluck the fruit, and huge headway can
be made in protecting data.”).
73. Microsoft helps law enforcement authorities take down harmful botnets. See, e.g., Microsoft
Teams Up with Law Enforcement and Other Partners to Disrupt Gamarue (Andromeda), MICROSOFT
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/12/04/microsoft-teams-up-withlaw-enforcement-and-other-partners-to-disrupt-gamarue-andromeda/
[ https://perma.cc/DL8FDNFM ] (“Today, with help from Microsoft security researchers, law enforcement agencies around the
globe, in cooperation with Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU), announced the disruption of
Gamarue, a widely distributed malware that has been used in networks of infected computers
collectively called the Andromeda botnet.”).
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law enforcement issues.74 Smith, and surely other tech industry leaders, believe it is
their responsibility to take these steps to protect their users.
There may be another explanation for tech companies’ nascent role as
legislators of global cybersecurity law: the desire for power. The current state of
affairs in global cybersecurity law allows tech companies to perform such a role,
since states are entirely unable to maintain their inherent authority in collectively
regulating global cybersecurity, for reasons discussed below. But first, to fully
understand how tech companies may become such legislators, it is important to
review the current “legislative” steps that Microsoft and other companies have
engaged in.
A. Geneva 5.0
The world needs a Digital Geneva Convention, says Brad Smith.75 There are
simply too many cyberattacks targeting the private sector, and we need some kind
of international legal framework that will commit actors to norms on
cyberspace conduct.76
The idea that the world needs a fifth Geneva Convention77
—a Geneva 5.0—to address humanitarian concerns in cyberspace and protect
civilians from cyberattacks during peacetime is somewhat misguided. After all, the
Geneva Convention’s primary purpose is not only to protect civilians, but also to
strike an acceptable balance between military necessity and humanitarian values.78
As such, international humanitarian law authorizes the use of direct force against
combatants and allows for collateral damage involving civilians and civilian property
resulting from an attack, so long as that collateral damage is proportionate to the
military advantage sought.79 This is a problematic vision from the humanitarian
perspective, since it still confers a rather broad degree of discretion on warring
states. In peacetime, the protection of civilians is the raison d’être of international

74. Madeline Carr, Public-Private Partnership in National Cyber-Security Strategies, 92 INT’L
AFF. 43 (2016).
75. Smith, supra note 9.
76. Id.
77. The four current Geneva Conventions focus on (1) wounded and sick soldiers on land
during war; (2) wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war; (3) rights of and
obligations in respect to prisoners of war; and (4) protection of civilians, including in occupied territory.
See The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS
(Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/genevaconventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm [ https://perma.cc/UP2T-GXVQ ].
78. Paul Weidenbaum, Necessity in International Law, 24 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 105,
110 (1938) (“The Conventions expressly declare to strike a balance between military necessity and a
humane conception of warfare.”).
79. Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule14 [ https://perma.cc/93F9-4RJ7 ] (“Launching an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”).
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human rights law, which seeks to protect civilians from governmental overreach.80
The same protections ought to apply online.81 Extending the rules and norms of
wartime international humanitarian law to the peacetime use of cyberattacks is a
dangerous move.82 It would mean that some peacetime cyberattacks, when directed
at military objectives, would be legal. It would also harm civilians in “indirect” ways,
which international humanitarian law largely tolerates.
However, the idea the we may need a new Digital Geneva Convention
generates some important and difficult questions with regard to the protection of
civilians in cyberspace during armed conflict.83 First and foremost, what is it about
international humanitarian law at present that renders it ineffectual? Specifically,
why is it that the tech industry, with Microsoft in the lead, decided that this ought
to be their newest conquest?
As alluded to earlier, there are simply too many questions on how this law
applies in different situations in cyberspace. One could argue that there are certain
gaps in the law that leave civilians vulnerable to certain kinds of cyberattacks that
produce negative effects for individuals and society at large.84 The reason for that
could be that either custom involving international humanitarian law or its accepted
interpretation has not yet caught up with emerging offensive uses of cyberspace in

80. In the cybersecurity context, the question would be whether a foreign government
mounting a cyberattack against another nation would satisfy the effective control standard required by
international human rights law to determine its obligations vis-à-vis a foreign government’s citizens. See
Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395 (2011) (“Nearly every other foreign and international body
examined here concludes that countries that exert ‘effective control’ over a territory, person, or situation
must observe basic human rights obligations.”).
81. H.R.C. Res. 32/13, supra note 36, ¶ 1 (“[T]he same rights that people have offline must also
be protected online.”).
82. Francesca Casalini & Stefania Di Stefano, State Behaviour in Cyberspace: Moving Away from
a Military Discourse, DIPLO (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/state-behaviourcyberspace-moving-away-military-discourse [ https://perma.cc/5YS5-EY8S ] (“Since it remains unclear
when a cyber-operation attains the level of armed attack for the purposes of IHL, and since the aims
pursued by Microsoft’s proposal are largely different from those pursued by the laws of war, it would
seem more appropriate to re-think the Microsoft proposal as an instrument that would seek to establish
a system of Internet governance, and that does not aim at affecting or replacing any other existing legal
regime. It could simply represent the acknowledgment that there are new phenomena that are in need
of regulation. In this sense, the ‘peacetime’ qualification does not add value, and generates a risk that
the proposed rules would be considered displaceable in times of war, whereas the particular relationship
that exists between the state and the private sector in the cyber realm would persist even during an
armed conflict. For these reasons, we suggest removing the peacetime qualification altogether.”).
83. Tarah Wheeler, In Cyberwar, There Are No Rules, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/in-cyberwar-there-are-no-rules-cybersecurity-war-defense/
[ https://perma.cc/P4JM-VURL ] (providing an account of how the lack of rules may evolve into a
full-scale cyberwar).
84. Paul Nicholas, Filling the Gaps in International Law Is Essential to Making Cyberspace a
Safer Place, MICROSOFT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/27/
filling-the-gaps-in-international-law-is-essential-to-making-cyberspace-a-safer-place/
[ https://
perma.cc/UH92-9SE3 ].
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armed conflict, which could result in lethal and nonlethal but dangerous harms.85
As a result, there may be some considerable definitional and normative gaps that
need to be addressed if we wish to maintain an adequate level of protection for
civilians. For example, for an action to be an “attack,” must it cause death, or would
any other effects qualify?86 Is civilian data an “object” protected from direct
“attack”? How are nonlethal effects calculated in comparison to lethal effects
in cyberspace?
Second, extending the law governing war to peacetime seems directly
antithetical. That law, after all, is more permissive when it comes to civilian
casualties and damage to their property, as wars often involve a certain degree of
suffering or, in legalese, proportionate collateral civilian damage that is permissible
under international humanitarian law.87 Why does Geneva 5.0 make this dangerous
leap? A simple explanation would be that this is a common conflation between
humanitarian and human rights law, both striking their own balances and pursuing
different values and policy goals. While human rights law has a role to play in both
peacetime and wartime,88 humanitarian law only applies in an armed conflict.89
But there may be a more complicated and less intuitive explanation, which
stems from the nature of cyberattacks. That explanation has to do with the
ever-blurring dividing line between war and peace.90 The argument goes that
international humanitarian law applies only during armed conflict.91 Over the
decades, however, conflicts have become more complex, involving non-state actors
such as terrorist organizations and private militias. Some weapons, such as

85. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Cyberwar & International Law Step Zero, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355,
374 (2015) (“[C]yber weapons create the possibility of actions that cause severe harm to the victim, but
nevertheless do not result in physical damage or injury to persons. The paradigmatic example is an
attack that wipes out information stored on a system or network, such as a stock exchange.”).
86. Kilovaty, supra note 47, at 127 (“The key to incorporate disruptive cyber operations within
the scope of ‘attack’ under IHL is to interpret ‘acts of violence’ as including cyber operations with
disruptive effects.”); cf. Pete Pascucci & Kurt Sanger, Why a Broad Definition of “Violence” in Cyber
Conflict Is Unwise and Legally Unsound, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
38536/broad-definition-violence-cyber-conflict-unwise-legally-unsound/
[ https://perma.cc/
WH2L-BK78 ].
87. Stephen Petkis, Rethinking Proportionality in the Cyber Context, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1431,
1440 (2016) (“According to this jus in bello conception of proportionality, a state must balance the
‘concrete and direct’ military advantage it is likely to obtain against any incidental harm its actions are
likely to cause civilians.”).
88. Oona Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883 (2012) (offering three
models to explain the role and applicability of international human rights law in armed conflict).
89. Id. at 1888 (“Humanitarian law applies only in situations of armed conflict; hence the
applicability of this body of law turns on whether an armed conflict or occupation exists.”).
90. See, e.g., ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016); Rosa Brooks, There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 13, 2015, 5:47 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/theres-no-suchthing-as-peacetime-forever-war-terror-civil-liberties/ [ https://perma.cc/7WQ2-RBTK ].
91. See Hathaway et al., supra note 88, at 1888.
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cyberattacks, have become “democratized”92 (accessible to non-state actors) and
wield more disruptive than destructive power (though they can certainly be
destructive). Therefore, their effects are not reaching the level of intensity usually
associated with a traditional armed conflict, but it does not entirely feel like
peacetime either.93 It is an intermediate category, somewhere in between the two
extremes of war and peace, that the law has failed to recognize and regulate.94
Rosa Brooks has long argued that we are overly obsessed with antiquated
distinctions between wartime and peacetime.95 This is a critical conversation to have
with regard to cyber weapons, as they can cause massive disruption, potentially
leading to humanitarian crises, but are rarely directly lethal. This is where the
comfortable analogy between cyber and non-cyber weapons is not as obvious.96
This leads to a seemingly simple question, though the answer may not be easy at
all: What would be considered “cyber peace” and at what point does the use of
cyber weapons reach the threshold of “cyber war”? How do we distinguish the
regulation of cyber war from regular war, and is such a distinction even required?
The question is further exacerbated by Microsoft’s recent petition on “Digital
Peace,” in which “digital citizens” are demanding digital peace.97 What does that
mean, and who gets to answer that question?98
Third, it is important to acknowledge the identity and interests guiding the
actors engaged in privatizing cybersecurity law. After all, international humanitarian

92. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 109 (“The online world is one of strategic instability, given the
relative ease and stealth of state-sponsored attacks, and the fact that it is almost impossible to tell
whether a purely defensive cyber action is in fact hostile.”).
93. Michael Schmitt, Five Myths in the Debate About Cyber War, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23,
2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/918/myths-debate-cyber-war/ [ https://perma.cc/6CL9-Q5BW ]
(explaining that a non-international armed conflict involving only cyberattack would have two
features: “First, the intensity criterion would require protracted cyberattacks causing extensive physical
damage or death. Second, the organization criterion would generally exclude operations, no matter how
severe, conducted by groups organized entirely online”).
94. Alexander Greenawalt, If War Is Everywhere, Then Must the Law Be Nowhere?, 32
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 25 (2018) (explaining that the distinction between war and peace is essential
for determining whether killing is justified or not).
95. Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict
in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004) (“These binary distinctions [between war and
peace] are no longer tenable. In almost every sphere, globalization has complicated once straightforward
legal categories, but this is nowhere more apparent and more troubling than in the realms of armed
conflict and national security law. Although the boundaries between ‘war’ and ‘nonwar,’ and between
‘national security’ and ‘domestic issues,’ have been eroding for some time, September 11 and its
aftermath have highlighted the increasing incoherence and irrelevance of these traditional
legal categories.”).
96. Eichensehr, supra note 85, at 374.
97. Demand Digital Peace Now, supra note 23.
98. As one commentator observed: “The DGC [Digital Geneva Convention] picks and chooses
International Humanitarian Law principles and taglines at its convenience, without fully developing the
concepts.” Raquel Vázquez Llorente, A Digital Geneva Convention? The Role of the Private Sector in
Cybersecurity, LSE IDEAS STRATEGIC UPDATE, May 2018, at 10, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/
Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-The-Role-of-the-Private-Sector-in-Cybersecurity.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/MSU4-3VFA ].

First to Printer_Kilovaty.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVATIZED CYBERSECURITY LAW

5/28/20 8:13 PM

1197

law was created by states and, mostly, for the benefit of states.99 Why did the tech
industry suddenly decide to take up the reins of protecting civilians in cyberspace?
This desire for power in a space plagued with normative ambiguities may lead to
some serious issues with respect to the absence of certain values such as
transparency and accountability.
In many instances, these tech companies advocate for forming the
aforementioned CRC, or “Cyber-ICRC.”100 But whereas the ICRC is a neutral
organization that is not motivated by profits or capitalist power and is governed by
clear rules, norms, and values, with the consent of state parties to the Geneva
Conventions, that is not necessarily the case for the CRC. The CRC would involve
tech companies in an unprecedented fashion, further enhancing their power and
standing in the global community. From a normative-content perspective, Geneva
5.0 is far from the only prescription promoted by tech companies. The
Cybersecurity Tech Accord, a set of rules that seventy global tech companies
committed themselves to, is perhaps the most significant development with respect
to the privatization of cybersecurity law.101
B. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord
To strengthen their commitment to their users, a group of global tech
companies has signed the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, a public commitment to
“protect and empower our users and customers, and thereby to improve the
security, stability, and resilience of cyberspace.”102 Microsoft initiated this process
in the spring of 2018, with over sixty global tech companies signing on the Accord’s
principles.103 Underlying this Accord is the understanding that cyberspace has
become the cornerstone of global society. Global society relies on the Internet for
communication, business, entertainment, infrastructure, education, and much more.
But such reliance creates fertile ground for criminal and state-sponsored offensive
activity, which undermines the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the data,
services, and applications used throughout cyberspace.104

99. Eichensehr, supra note 85, at 366 (“[I]nternational law has traditionally operated at the level
of sovereign States, and the independence of sovereigns engendered a strong tradition that States are
bound only by international law to which they consent.”).
100. Elaine Korzak & Herb Lin, Proposal for a Cyber-International Committee of the Red Cross,
LAWFARE (Oct. 17, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposal-cyber-internationalcommittee-red-cross [ https://perma.cc/B6H8-FHUT ].
101. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54.
102. Id.
103. Rob Wright, Cybersecurity Tech Accord Expands with New Members, Partners,
T ECHT ARGET
(Sept. 25, 2018),
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252449304/
Cybersecurity-Tech-Accord-expands-with-new-members-partners [ https://perma.cc/2UHE-8RNX ]
(“The Cybersecurity Tech Accord was first unveiled by Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, during his
keynote at RSA Conference 2018.”).
104. Isabella Uria, Hacking the Election Conference (Write Up), YALE L. SCH. (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/hacking_the_election_
conference_report_11.01.16.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JSG7-CWMR ] (quoting Professor Jack Goldsmith
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The Cybersecurity Tech Accord contains merely four principles.105 First, tech
companies pledge to protect their users from cyberattacks by providing products
and services with built-in security and privacy.106 Second, tech companies will not
provide assistance to governments or any other organization in the launch of
cyberattacks.107 Third, tech companies will educate users on tools available to them,
and will support civil society, governmental, and organizational efforts in advancing
global cybersecurity.108 And, fourth, tech companies will create formal and informal
partnerships to enhance cybersecurity—sharing information on threats, patching
vulnerabilities, and encouraging global information-sharing to protect civilians and
help in recovery efforts from cyberattacks.109
It would make sense for major tech companies to commit to these principles.
Aside from being a positive public relations step, it is also a reliable and practical
commitment, since these tech companies happen to control significant portions of
the infrastructure, products, and services that populate cyberspace. Therefore, they
believe that they ought to be the “first responders” in cyberspace.110 These
principles thus appear at first glance to be a positive development in protecting
civilians from harmful cyber activity. But that value judgement only holds if we
detach these principles from the tech economy and its motivations, which raises a
variety of as-yet unanswered questions.111 For example, what is the role of tech
companies in enforcing and interpreting these principles?
C. A Cyber Red Cross
The idea of creating an organization whose expertise it is to resolve
humanitarian crises in cyberspace has been promoted by several scholars for
years.112 Duncan Hollis and Tim Maurer, following a series of serious cybersecurity
incidents, including against Sony, Target, Home Depot, and J.P. Morgan Chase,
argued in 2015 that “the time is ripe for a bolder approach to cybersecurity . . .
cyberspace could use a global cyber federation, a federation of non-governmental

as observing that “‘the United States has the most robust cyber capability in the world, but it is also the
most vulnerable,’ due to its extensive dependence on computer systems in the public, private, and
military sectors”).
105. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Lousie Hurel & Luisa Lobato, Unpacking Cyber Norms: Private Companies as Norm
Entrepreneurs, 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 61, 63 (2018).
111. Andrew Keane Woods, Tech Firms Are Not Sovereigns, in HOOVER INST. AEGIS PAPER
SERIES 3 (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/
woods_webreadypdf.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4548-C744 ] (answering the question of what tech
companies are up to: “making money”).
112. Duncan Hollis & Tim Maurer, A Red Cross for Cyberspace, TIME (Feb. 18, 2015, 10:04
AM), https://time.com/3713226/red-cross-cyberspace/ [ https://perma.cc/GBW9-9Y8F ].
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institutions similar to the role of the Red Cross . . . .”113 Hollis and Maurer’s vision
is to make Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) throughout the world
the building blocks of this new “independent, neutral, and impartial” institution.114
Their proposal involves neither for-profit private actors or state actors within the
structure of this new institution.
It took three years for that proposal to be reexamined and reintroduced in a
modified form. Herb Lin and Elaine Korzak have advocated for the creation of a
“Cyber-International Committee of the Red Cross.”115 Lin and Korzak’s
reexamination was triggered by the creation of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord,
discussed above. They believe its principles will only be effectuated if there is an
institution to back them up.
The CyberPeace Institute, established in late 2019, is an example of such
emerging CRC organization.116 The CyberPeace Institute involves both for-profit
and non-profit entities within an organization that seeks to protect civilians from
cyber-attacks, assist in accountability, and advance international law norms for
responsible behavior in cyberspace.117 While it is too early to pass judgement on the
CyberPeace Institute’s mandate, there are some challenging issues that may require
further attention in the years to come.
Some of these issues include whether the CyberPeace Institute will commit to
principles of transparency, independence from corporate capture, neutrality
vis-à-vis state governments, and accountability. While the CyberPeace Institute
claims to be guided by these principles, it remains to be seen whether they can be
upheld in practice. Of particular challenge are scenarios where: (1) certain tech
corporations make profit off data collected and analyzed by the CyberPeace
Institute; (2) the victim of a cyber-attack requesting assistance is a politically
controversial organization (terrorist group, for example), forcing the Institute to
decide whether to offer assistance or not; (3) there is a conflict between international
law and norms created and practiced by the Institute; (4) there is a conflict between
the mandate of existing institutions (ICRC, for example) and the Institute.
In the years to come, the CyberPeace Institute (and any other CRC) may face
pushback from governments. For example, some governments may be concerned
that their views are not fairly represented, that the investigative powers and expertise
of the Institute may somehow prejudice their national security, or that their ability
to create norms for cyberspace is preempted by the Institute’s mandate. As always,
some of these objections may be more reasonable than others.
These challenges notwithstanding, the idea of a CRC as a global institution
seeking to promote stability and trust in cyberspace appears desirable. At the same
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Korzak & Lin, supra note 100.
116. See CyberPeace Institute, About Us, https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/about-us
[ https://perma.cc/K6PH-A9Y8 ] ( last visited May 26, 2020 ).
117. Id.
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time, it requires further unpacking. The debate on whether the world needs a CRC
could be a debate over whether there is a need for: (1) a humanitarian assistance
organization; (2) an independent institution for the investigation and attribution of
cyberattacks; (3) a reliable cybersecurity expertise institution; (4) an institution
creating and promoting norms for an ever-evolving cyberspace threat landscape; or
(5) a neutral and apolitical institution performing an entirely professional function
for global cybersecurity. More than anything, if tech companies become involved in
a CRC scheme, it would essentially mean that they will possess insurmountable and
unprecedented power in global cybersecurity governance. To illustrate that, I
discuss these five concepts in turn.
1. Humanitarian Assistance
Say there is a cyberattack against critical infrastructure targets, such as the
power grid, the Internet’s backbone, or the healthcare sector, causing a serious
humanitarian crisis. Which global institution has the capacity to effectively address
such a crisis? The immediate association that comes to mind is the ICRC. The ICRC
has indeed been at the forefront of humanitarian assistance, alleviating suffering,
mitigating atrocities, and assisting in holding accountable those responsible. Indeed,
the ICRC might be helpful for responding to some aspects of cyber-humanitarian
crises. But could the ICRC assist in restoring affected computer systems and
networks? Could it provide assistance to ensure that such a humanitarian disaster
does not reoccur?
The CRC, therefore, would be the ICRC equivalent for humanitarian crises in
cyberspace. It would assist in restoring affected targets, advise on best measures,
and fill the gap where states are unwilling or unable to assist their own victimized
subjects. This notion of humanitarian assistance is closely related to other functions
often mentioned with regard to a CRC. For example, it could assist in investigation
and attribution where victims cannot get their state’s government to do so, whether
because the state does not have the capacity or is unwilling. As Lin and Korzak
argue, the CRC will “fill an assistance gap that is particularly felt by victims who
lack the capacity or resources to respond to or recover from cyberattacks.”118
2. Investigation and Attribution
Attribution, “the ability to confidently say who did it: which country,
government agency, group, or even individual is responsible for a cyber intrusion
or attack”119 is key in assigning international responsibility. But because attackers

118. Id.
119. John Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to National Security
Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 391, 396 (2016).
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may leverage and benefit from anonymity,120 attribution is often seen as one of the
major challenges of global cybersecurity.121
Investigation and attribution—done neutrally, independently, professionally,
and promptly—are critical functions in cyberspace that are currently institutionally
absent from the structure of the global community.122 Currently, if an entity (other
than the government itself) becomes the victim of a cyberattack, that victim can
only ask for assistance from its local law enforcement or, more broadly, the state.
However, decisions on whether to investigate, how to proceed with an investigation,
and who the culprit is are often affected by a series of political and strategic
interests.123 For example, will the victim’s state blame a powerful nation for
initiating a cyberattack if there are major economic interests involved with that
nation? Should the state reveal its evidence at the expense of compromising its
means and methods? And most importantly, what is the threshold above which
attribution should be deemed certain?
A CRC, among other things, would provide this neutral and independent
function of investigating and attributing cyberattacks without having to consider the
myriad political and strategic interests that states are often prone to. The CRC would
have to possess cutting-edge cybersecurity expertise, constantly improving its means
and methods, to ensure that attribution is accurate and that attackers do not
outsmart it and compromise its investigation and attribution functions.
3. Cybersecurity Expertise
To ensure that the global community maintained its trust in the CRC, the CRC
would have to constantly be on the forefront of cybersecurity knowledge and
practice. Cybersecurity offense-defense is often analogized to a cat-and-mouse
game, where attackers constantly improve their techniques to overcome defensive

120. Id. at 409 (“[A]ttributing activity on the Internet is challenging. Hackers often route their
malicious traffic through third-party proxies they either rent or compromise. An attacker in Eastern
Europe that uses a botnet of compromised computers in the Middle East to conduct a DDoS attack
against a U.S. target creates a false narrative that actors located in the Middle East were responsible for
that act. Even attributing an attack to the actual originating computer may be insufficient; we may know
the machine used to execute a hack, but not the person or group that controlled it. Thus, technical
investigation must often be supplemented by credible human intelligence. And all of this must be done
quickly and consistently; attribution is of little use if it takes years and only identifies a small fraction
of attackers.”).
121. Christopher Rosana Nyabuto, A Game of Code: Challenges of Cyberspace as a Domain of
Warfare, 3 STRATHMORE L. REV. 49, 51 (2018).
122. However, the RAND Corporation previously proposed a global attribution agency
modeled on the International Atomic Energy Agency following Microsoft’s mention of the idea. See
Milton Mueller, A Global Cyber-Attribution Organization—Thinking It Through, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT ( June 4, 2017), https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/06/04/a-globalcyber-attribution-org/ [ https://perma.cc/SW8Y-8HQK ].
123. See Marcus Schulzke, The Politics of Attributing Blame for Cyberattacks and the Costs of
Uncertainty, 16 PERSP. POL. 954 (2018).
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barriers created by defenders.124 Defenders need to defend against all possible
attacks and attackers,125 while attackers only need to succeed once.126
Proposals for a CRC often highlight that such an institution would possess
cybersecurity expertise on a global scale, a one-stop shop of sorts, which would
allow states and other actors to benefit from its expertise. This expertise would
exceed mere investigative and attribution assistance, focusing additionally on
preventive (defensive) cybersecurity.
4. Global Norm-Creation
Next, the CRC might be able to fill in an important gap in creating global
cybersecurity norms. Deep geopolitical differences between states impede the ability
of international law to develop effective standards and rules for global cybersecurity.
The CRC might be able to remedy this situation by developing norms and best
practices that would not be influenced by geopolitical differences and unsatisfactory
compromise. Rather, they would reflect the consensus of the world’s professional
information security community. Clearly, states set certain thresholds through
treaties and customary international law—such as the existence of an armed attack
or armed conflict—but the CRC could still be relevant in its ability to provide
neutral standards and rules applicable in all situations, with the goal of improving
information security.
5. Global Apolitical Authority
Perhaps more symbolically, the CRC will be a professional institution that is
not subordinated to any state’s government. This may enhance its global credibility
and discourage actors from contesting its findings. However, there may need to be
a mechanism in place to resolve any factual or legal disputes arising from
CRC’s activity.
6. The Cyber Red Cross’s Utility
The idea of a CRC is a good one, but it needs to be done right. Currently, tech
companies are seeking a central role in such institution, which could raise a host of

124. Colin Barker, Hackers and Defenders Continue Cybersecurity Game of Cat and Mouse,
ZDNET (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.zdnet.com/article/hackers-and-defenders-continue-cybersecurity-game-of-cat-and-mouse/ [ https://perma.cc/T65F-3ZZR ] (“The cyber arms race between
hackers and the defenders of corporate networks continues apace.”).
125. WILLIS H. WARE, SECURITY CONTROLS FOR COMPUTER SYSTEMS: REPORT OF
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER SECURITY (RAND Corp. reissued 1979),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R609-1.html, [ https://perma.cc/43WW-9CQ7 ] (“The system
designer must be aware of the points of vulnerability, which may be thought of as leakage points, and
he must provide adequate mechanisms to counteract both accidental and deliberate events. The specific
leakage points . . . [include] physical surroundings, hardware, software, communication links, and
organizational (personnel and procedures).”).
126. JOSEPH NYE, THE FUTURE OF POWER 125 (2011) (“Because the internet was designed
for ease of use rather than security, the offense currently has the advantage over the defense.”).
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concerns, discussed in Part III below. The objection to the idea of a new institution
for humanitarian cyberspace matters is not so much with the institution itself, but
rather with the involvement of private tech companies in matters that pertain to
human rights and war.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISRUPTION
There are many international legal questions that tech companies on their own
cannot practically solve,127 nor do they have the democratic legitimacy and
transparency required to do so. 128 However, tech companies are still beginning to
engage in creating international norms and rules to address security issues arising in
cyberspace. On top of that, their relative degree of uncontested success in creating
such norms and rules is due to states’ inability to bridge geopolitical divides, making
it unlikely that states will reach a consensus on how to regulate cybersecurity globally
in the near future.129 Tech companies have decided to take on that role.
International law, at least traditionally, involves norms and rules created by
states, either through their explicit consent in treaties or through custom developed
through the years which states consider to be legally binding.130 Formally speaking,
the three authoritative instruments that make up international law are treaties,
custom, and general principles.131 Judicial decisions (such as the International Court
of Justice’s) and legal scholarship reflect subsidiary sources for determining the rules
of international law.132
Currently, there is no universal treaty on how cybersecurity relates to
civilians,133 nor is there a prevailing and long-standing custom that could inform
states of the best practices and red lines applicable to their offensive and defensive
127. Pamela Lian, ‘Digital Geneva Convention’? What’s Next for Internet Governance Challenges?,
ITU NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://news.itu.int/digital-geneva-convention-whats-next-for-internetgovernance-challenges/ [ https://perma.cc/9J7J-VCGZ ] (“Neither national governments, nor the
technology sector, nor civil society, nor anyone else can alone solve the challenges of
technological progress.”).
128. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1051, 1084 (2017) (“[T]he major antitrust concerns surround the control of data by a small
number of concentrated companies and the lack of transparency about their collection and usage.”); see
also Jacob Kasternakes, FCC Chairman Says Twitter, Facebook, Google May Need Transparency Law,
VERGE (Sept. 4, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/4/17819418/fcc-chairman-webcompany-transparency-regulation-pai [ https://perma.cc/JDW6-VYB8 ] (“The leader of the Federal
Communications Commission says that major web companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have
offered little transparency into how they work—and it’s time to seriously consider forcing them to
tell us.”).
129. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 2.
130. Brown & Poellet, supra note 44, at 126 (“The body of international law is a jumble of
historic practice and tradition as well as signed agreements between nations.”).
131. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
132. Id. art. 38(1)(d).
133. See Ido Kilovaty & Itamar Mann, Towards a Cyber-Security Treaty, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 3,
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32268/cyber-security-treaty/ [ https://perma.cc/P8KT-6ZWS ]
(arguing that a cyber-specific treaty is needed to protect civilians and institutions).
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use of cyberspace.134 There seems to be a major geopolitically- and
ideologically-based disagreement among states as to what these practices and red
lines should be, particularly between the states that are principally involved in
cyberspace and thus benefitting from its use: the United States, United Kingdom,
Russia, China, Israel, and Iran, to name a few.135
It therefore comes as no surprise that corporations have taken charge in
arguing for an amendment to and reevaluation of existing international law norms
and rules that fail to provide reasonable protections for civilians in cyberspace.
Microsoft’s attempts to promote a Digital Geneva Convention that would extend
to peacetime the protections afforded to civilians during wartime is one example of
such involvement.
This Part looks at states’ current international endeavors to develop
frameworks for regulating global cybersecurity. As this Article has argued, these
attempts have largely failed. As a consequence, private tech companies are taking
over. This Part looks at what exactly these norms are and how they may end up
regulating international relations in the cybersecurity context. Finally, it looks at
whether these developments represent a normative crisis.
A. International Legal Failure
Why does international law fail to regulate state conduct in cyberspace? There
may be many compelling answers to this question. Perhaps there is disagreement
over how some legal terms of art apply in cyberspace. For example, what is an
“attack”136 or a “use of force” in cyberspace?137 There is certainly some practical
difficulty in attempting to apply territorial concepts to an aterritorial space.138 The
134. Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on
Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 595 (2018) (arguing not only that
there isn’t any current state practice on the matter, but that it is unlikely one will evolve anytime
soon: “The lack of transparency in the field—underreporting of cyberoperations and limited attribution
claims—makes it difficult to identify relevant state practice”).
135. Sintia Radu, China, Russia Biggest Cyber Offenders, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2019, 5:30
PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2019-02-01/china-and-russia-biggestcyber-offenders-since-2006-report-shows [ https://perma.cc/EF9U-2SB4 ] (citing a report studying the
most active countries in cyber offense, which “examined data on China, North Korea, Iran, India,
Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Ukraine, Israel
and France”).
136. Protocol I, supra note 41, at art. 49(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 36 (defining “attacks” as “acts of
violence against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense”). For a thorough discussion and
analysis of which offensive uses of cyberspace constitute an “attack” and how an “attack” ought to
adapt to the realities of cyber offense, see Kilovaty, supra note 47.
137. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also Kim Zetter, Legal Experts: Stuxnet Attack on Iran Was
Illegal ‘Act of Force’, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2013, 12:53 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/stuxnetact-of-force/ [ https://perma.cc/E9QG-F5CC ] (arguing that the Stuxnet worm unleashed against the
Iranian nuclear program may have violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force).
See generally Matthew Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force” Under UN Charter Article 2(4), 87 INT’L
L. STUD. 43 (2011).
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 379 (2015)
(observing that data is “unterritorial”).
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issue may also be about boundary-setting. We know that international law protects
state sovereignty, but how far does that sovereignty extend in cyberspace?139 Also,
international humanitarian law allows a certain degree of collateral damage to
civilians and civilian objects. But does damage to data fall within the scope of
“civilian objects”?140 Or, perhaps the reason is far more grounded in realism than
anyone can imagine, with states seeking to keep their power to clandestinely and
effectively engage in state-to-state offensive activity in cyberspace.141 In this context,
cyberspace would be a legal terra incognita, where the legal aspects of state activity in
cyberspace is not only unexplored but also undesirable from the states’ points
of view.142
Indeed, the work of Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany suggests that states,
particularly those significantly engaged in cyberspace, are reluctant to accept legally
binding rules for their conduct because they have “a limited interest in promoting
legal certainty regarding the regulation of cyberspace.”143 This suggests that there is
nothing structurally flawed with the law, but rather the challenge is with states who
wish to retain their authority and power by resisting the infusion of cyberspace with
legal standards and rules. It therefore comes as no surprise that tech companies are
taking over a role that the international community is unable to perform.
Kubo Macak’s work on the crisis of international law and cybersecurity is
equally alarming.144 Macak identifies three trends that together support his assertion
that international law has not only failed to regulate cybersecurity, but also that we
are in an actual crisis.145 First, there are no attempts to codify the rules applicable to
global cybersecurity in a binding treaty.146 Second, states are reluctant to develop
binding customary international law.147 And, third, whatever multilateral processes

139. Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND
207, 210 (2017) (“The principle of sovereignty is universal, but its application to the unique
particularities of the cyberspace domain remains for states to determine through state practice and/or
the development of treaty rules.”).
140. See, e.g., Heather Harisson Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the
Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISR. L. REV. 39, 45 (2015) (arguing that data should
be recognized as object to better protect civilians); Kubo Macak, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for
Interpretive Computer Data as Objects Under International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55, 55
(2015) (arguing that data ought to be an ‘object’); Michael Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ During Cyber
Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L. REV. 81, 84 (2015)
(arguing that data should not be characterized as an object in itself).
141. Dan Efrony, Is It Time to Regulate Cyber Conflicts?, LAWFARE (May 4, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/it-time-regulate-cyber-conflicts
[ https://perma.cc/6N4N-QW7D ]
(“The legal and political ambiguity coupled with the power to act covertly benefits the most
technologically capable nations in cyberspace, and those nations won’t voluntarily give away their newly
acquired strategic superiority.”).
142. Id.
143. Efrony & Shany, supra note 134, at 585.
144. Kubo Macak, Is the International Law of Cyber Security in Crisis?, 8 INT’L CONF. CYBER
CONFLICT 127 (2016).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 129–30.
147. Id. at 130.
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still take place, their focus tends to be on nonbinding norms.148 What follows is a
review of some of the most prominent processes and efforts to establish the
international rules for global cybersecurity.
1. U.N. Group of Governmental Experts
The United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was an effort
to create and clarify rules of conduct in cyberspace. The U.N. GGE was established
in 1999 to consider “Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.”149 The GGEs
consisted of fifteen to twenty representatives of member states who would examine
an issue and report back to the General Assembly if they were able to come to a
consensus agreement on a report. Three of these GGEs were successful in
producing such reports, in 2010, 2013, and 2015.
The project gained the favor of the G-7,150 G-20,151 and the OECD,152 and
appeared to be on the right track to achieve something truly revolutionary153: a
comprehensive set of rules clarifying and constraining transnational state behavior
in cyberspace. The apex of this endeavor was in 2015, when the GGE released a
report containing a series of rules that was seemingly uncontroversial, representing
what appeared to be a strong consensus.154 For example, the report suggested that
a state should “not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its
obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure
or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide
services to the public.”155 Even though GGE Reports rules are voluntary and
nonbinding, states did not accept these recommendations and the project collapsed

148. Id. at 131.
149. G.A. Res. 53/70, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security ( Jan. 4, 1999) (“Calls upon Member States to promote at
multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of
information security.”).
150. The Year in Review: The Death of the UN GGE Process?, COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/year-review-death-un-gge-process [ https://
perma.cc/MW4J-EJCY ].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Joseph Marks, U.N. Body Agrees to U.S. Norms in Cyberspace, POLITICO ( July 9, 2015,
12:44 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/un-body-agrees-to-us-norms-in-cyberspace119900 [ https://perma.cc/9BRD-KMW2 ] (“It’s a breakthrough for U.S. diplomats, who have been
pushing these ‘norms’ as an alternative to formal treaties as a way to help tame the lawless frontier
of cyberspace.”).
154. Elaine Korzak, The 2015 GGE Report: What Next for Norms in Cyberspace?, LAWFARE
(Sept. 23, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2015-gge-report-what-next-normscyberspace [ https://perma.cc/VWA9-FB35 ].
155. Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and
Telecomms. in the Context of Int’l Sec., transmitted by letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the
Grp., U.N. Doc. A/70/174, at 8 ( July 22, 2015).
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entirely at the GGE’s last session in June 2017.156 As one commentator put it, “a
nearly seven-year process to write the rules that should guide state activity in
cyberspace came to a halt.”157 Many attribute this failure to inevitable geopolitical
differences between the United States, Russia, and China.158 This divide is rooted in
two different disagreements: whether the use of cyber operations should be allowed
at all159 (regulation vs. a complete ban) and which activities constitute cyber conflict
to begin with.160
This failure at the U.N.—the most international forum for states to negotiate
new regimes—created a normative vacuum that is likely to be usurped by other,
nongovernmental stakeholders: tech companies. Tech companies realize that states
were, are, and will be unable to reach a consensus, and that the normative and
geopolitical divide will only continue to deepen moving forward.
2. The Tallinn Manual
Unlike the U.N. GGE process, the Tallinn Manual161 was comprised of a
group of academics focused on how current law applies to cyber operations.162
There was no ambition to create new rules, regimes, or norms. The project was
pretty straightforward. The experts were to identify the law as it is at present (lex
lata) and apply that law to a new phenomenon: cyber operations.163

156. Arun Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed as Well?,
LAWFARE ( July 4, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-lawcyberspace-doomed-well [ https://perma.cc/2XS7-T2LH ].
157. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 109.
158. Elaine Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?, DIPLOMAT ( July 31, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/un-gge-on-cybersecurity-have-china-and-russia-just-madecyberspace-less-safe/ [ https://perma.cc/2X4F-HY2L ] (explaining in detail the reasons for the
disagreement between Russia, China, Cuba, and the United States).
159. Grigsby, supra note 53, at 113–14 (“While Washington wanted to further develop how
concepts such as neutrality, proportionality and distinction might constrain cyber conflict, Moscow and
Beijing saw Washington trying to find justifications in international law for the use of cyber means
during a conflict or of conventional means as a way to respond to cyber conflict, leading to destabilising
activity. Russian and Chinese diplomats wanted to concentrate their efforts on preventing cyber-based
conflict in the first place, instead of setting the rules for something that should not be allowed
to happen.”).
160. Id. at 114 (“China, Russia and the United States fundamentally disagree over the nature of
cyber conflict itself. Washington views cyber security as the protection of bits, software and hardware
from unauthorised use—such as manipulating data, accessing confidential data or making data
unavailable. In contrast, Beijing and Moscow prefer the term ‘information security’, which allows for
state control over online content so as to preserve regime stability.”).
161. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
162. Id. at 3 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 examines key aspects of the public international law governing
‘cyber operations.’”).
163. Id. (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 is intended as an objective restatement of the lex lata. Therefore,
the Experts involved in both projects assiduously avoided including statements reflecting lex ferenda.”)
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The process resulted in two separate manuals. The first, released in 2013,
focused narrowly on the international regulation of warfare.164 Questions of what
constitutes a “use of force,”165 an “attack,”166 and a “civilian”167 were commonplace
in the first Tallinn Manual. But this narrow approach, while relevant in armed
conflict situations, misses a substantial chunk of state activity in cyberspace.
Espionage,168 disruption,169 election interference,170 manipulation, and
disinformation are just a few examples of widespread activities that would not be
covered by warfare regulation, simply because they do not constitute war.
This understanding led to the Tallinn Manual 2.0, released in 2017. This
iteration broadened its methodology to include law relevant to cyber operations
below the threshold of war. This included questions such as, at what point does a
cyber operation violate the norm on nonintervention?171 How is sovereignty
conceptualized in cyberspace?172 To what extent does human rights law protect
Internet users from harmful state-sponsored activity?173
While the experts participating in the Tallinn Manual project were able to reach
consensus on how the law applies to cyber operations, acceptance of the Tallinn
Manual was very thin, to say the least. Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany found that
there was “limited support in state practice for certain key Rules of the Tallinn
Manual, and that it is difficult to ascertain whether states accept the Tallinn Rules
and wish them to become authoritative articulations of international law governing
cyberoperations.”174 In other words, the Tallinn Manual, while creating a
comprehensive and plausible set of rules, has failed in securing the acceptance of
the international community.
3. Other Processes
There are several other ongoing and prospective processes that revolve around
the creation of norms for state behavior in cyberspace. The Dutch-sponsored

164. See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id. at 106–10 (rule 30).
167. Id. at 104–05 (rule 29).
168. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 161, at 168 (“Although peacetime cyber espionage by
States does not per se violate international law, the method by which it is carried out might do so.”).
169. Id. at 312–27.
170. Id. at 313 (“This Rule addresses situations in which a State intervenes by cyber means in
the ‘internal or external affairs’. . . . [F]or example, by using cyber operations to remotely alter electronic
ballots and thereby manipulate an election.”).
171. Id. at 312.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id. at 179–208.
174. Efrony & Shany, supra note 134, at 585.
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Hague Process facilitates state follow-up on the Tallinn Manual 2.0 through an input
process, training, and state consultation.175
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace is another
nongovernmental project focused on the development of norms and rules to
promote international peace and security in cyberspace.176 It focuses on “reaching
new universal agreements on substantive standards for state behavior.”177
B. From State-Centric to Tech-Centric Legal Order
Many tech companies are becoming involved in initiatives tasked with creating
norms, rules, principles, and guidelines for different technological conundrums.
This trend reflects a new concept of how rules on technology are created. If in the
past we expected state governments to perform their roles by legislating, regulating,
creating norms, and governing, this basic premise is changing rather quickly with
the emergence of new technologies and complex issues in cyberspace. This trend
has two key characteristics. First, tech companies create norms. Second, these
norms apply to the conduct of states.
1. Norms Created by Tech Companies
Perhaps the main evolutionary aspect in how global cybersecurity norms are
being created is that private tech companies are the entities coming up with them.
But private tech companies are not legislators in the classic sense, though scholars
like Joel Reidenberg and Lawrence Lessig make it clear that architecture, or code, is
in fact a method of regulation in cyberspace.178 It is worth remembering that these
code regulators are for-profit corporations that seek to benefit their bottom line.
Many of the challenges with this form of norm creation derive from tech
exceptionalism and the inherent identity and motivation of private for-profit
corporations: profit seeking.

175. Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure
to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY ( June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/
international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/
[ https://perma.cc/
2ZPQ-W7XQ ].
176. GLOBAL COMMISSION ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE, https://cyberstability.org/
[ https://perma.cc/6FKY-349R ].
177. Duncan Hollis & Matthew Waxman, Promoting International Cybersecurity
Cooperation: Lessons from the Proliferation Security Initiative, 32 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 147,
149 (2018).
178. See Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through
Technology, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, 554 (1998) (“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source
of rulemaking. Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants.”); see
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 79 (2006) (“As the world is now, code writers are
increasingly lawmakers. They determine what the defaults of the Internet will be; whether privacy will
be protected; the degree to which anonymity will be allowed; the extent to which access will be
guaranteed. They are the ones who set its nature. Their decisions, now made in the interstices of how
the Net is coded, define what the Net is.”).
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Microsoft and other tech companies are not new to government-like roles.
They are already undertaking many governmental and quasi-governmental tasks.
For example, Microsoft is engaged in a public-private partnership with the
U.S. government to take down botnets around the world.179 While some would
certainly argue that this sort of public-private partnership is a success in that the
U.S. government is able to fight cybercrime with the assistance of the prowess of a
private tech company, others are concerned about the public values that are
implicated with private companies performing certain government-like functions.180
However, these partnerships, which the government often initiates and leads, are
different from the phenomenon of tech companies independently creating norms
with no substantial governmental or public oversight.
2. Norms Applicable to State Conduct
Private tech companies create norms, which are largely applicable to their own
business activities. However, with the emerging privatization of cyberspace law, we
begin to see that these norms also apply to the conduct of states in cyberspace,
whether in offense or defense. For example, the “neutrality” principle which tech
companies currently promote has to do with how these companies ought to treat
states requesting assistance in carrying out cyberattacks. Under the neutrality
principle, tech companies will treat requests from all states equally, regardless of the
identity of the state requesting assistance. Under such neutrality, they will treat
requests for assistance from the U.S. government, the Chinese government, the
Russian government, or any other, indiscriminately.
This, perhaps, does not represent a very new approach to how states seek
expertise and assistance in carrying out certain military, law enforcement, and at
times political operations. Rather, tech companies that have historically been
complacent and subservient to the states’ desires are now becoming more restrictive
and methodical on what sort of assistance and information they agree to provide
to states.
The positive consequence of tech companies setting the rules of the game is
that this pushes back on certain regimes’ abuses of power and authoritarianism.
Many tech companies have realized that to protect their consumers everywhere,
they need to restrict state governments and their access to and control of online
platforms, tools, and resources.
While it is certainly desirable that tech companies reduce abuse and harmful
state activity in cyberspace, the more problematic aspect of this trend is that states
are ceding a lot of control to tech companies that do not share the same

179. Zach Lerner, Microsoft the Botnet Hunter: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in
Mitigating Botnets, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 250–58 (2014) (reviewing the history and legitimacy of
the United States-Microsoft public-private partnership on botnet takedowns).
180. See Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 504–05.
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accountability, legitimacy, and transparency181 values as state governments,
particularly those elected by the public.182 In other words, international lawmaking
is being unintentionally delegated to private tech companies.
C. A Normative Crisis
Tech companies’ ability to restrict state governments worldwide has many
positive aspects, but it also reflects a larger flow in the redistribution of power in
cyberspace from states to tech companies.183 International law was traditionally
created by states, for states. Some changes over time led to more norms and laws
addressed at humans and their rights vis-à-vis their governments: human rights law.
There are also many examples of “bottom-up” international lawmaking, but nothing
of the scale and effect that tech companies’ ability to create law may have on
cyberspace and the global legal order. This privatization of cyberspace law may
become serious and consequential if states, the public, civil society organizations,
and other stakeholders do not step back to consider the ramifications.184
III. A NEW LEGAL ORDER
We are about to see a new legal order around cyberspace and technology. Tech
companies are not merely focused on one technology or one cyberspace issue, but
they rather want to assimilate themselves into the machine that produces law. Some
would argue that tech companies are performing a role that states will never be able
to: regulating cyberspace and new technologies. Indeed, there are many indications
that states lag behind in regulating and containing the risks of new technologies. But
at the same time, these same states are constrained by public values and norms that
mandate transparency, fairness, accountability, and more. States, while imperfect in
dealing with emerging issues in cyberspace, are under a whole different set of
normative pressures.
This Part consists of two sections. The first explores the different values that
typically govern state action and may therefore need to be assessed with respect to
the privatization of cybersecurity law. The second makes some observations with
regard to future private lawmaking on technology-related matters, calling for state

181. Id. at 506 (“Government actions are also subject to scrutiny through mechanisms such as
freedom-of-information requests and investigations by Congress or agency inspectors general.”).
182. Id. at 505–06 (“Governmental actors operate in a system of structural checks that, although
imperfect, constrains their actions. Government officials may be held accountable through
congressional oversight and elections either of themselves or of higher level officers who are
responsible for the actions of the bureaucracy.”).
183. Id. at 504 (“The increasing transfer of government functions to private actors in recent
decades has sparked academic and popular debate about privatization.”).
184. Hurel & Lobato, supra note 110, at 62 (recognizing the difficulty of platforms having a
monopoly on what they refer to as norm entrepreneurship, urging the participation of other
stakeholders as well: “Cybersecurity is best understood as a process triggered by the practices of
different actors, namely markets, think tanks, IT communities, governments, and security experts”).
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governments, civil society, and Internet users to take collective action to demand
certain safeguards to the values laid out in this Part.
A. Privatized Cybersecurity Law & Values
The privatization of cybersecurity law requires an in-depth examination of the
public law values affected by the tech industry’s usurpation of the global legislative
role.185 These values evolved as a measure to constrain governments’ power and
overreach.186 Generally, private entities were not considered to be menacing to
individual freedoms and other structural and normative principles such as
accountability and transparency. But these values are either absent or significantly
jeopardized when tech companies are performing a governmental function,187 as
“private interests are often at odds with public law values.”188 The values discussed
here are democratic legitimacy, transparency, privacy, neutrality, and parity.
1. Democratic Legitimacy
Typically, when legislatures create laws and regulators promulgate regulations,
they enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy. However, tech companies do not possess
an equivalent legitimacy in creating law and norms for cyberspace. Yet, the tech
sector still creates rules and norms without it. It can do so because international law
recognizes custom as an acceptable and primary source of law.189
We have seen statements reflecting this notion. Mark Zuckerberg claimed that,
“[i]n a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company.
We have this large community of people, and more than other technology
companies we’re really setting policies.”190
Statements and responses such as these empower platforms to pursue
quasi-legislative functions. State governments are not even necessarily pushing back.

185. See generally Eichensehr, supra note 12.
186. Laura Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 397,
400 (2006) (“[T]he protections contained in the U.S. Constitution are generally viewed as prohibitions
on state misconduct only . . . . Thus, widespread privatization potentially threatens a wide variety of
public law values.”).
187. However, some would argue that administrative law has long been informing the tech
industry on how to self-regulate in a way that replicates public governance. See Kate Klonick, The New
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1663
(2018) (“[A]dministrative law . . . has long implicated the motivations and systems created by private
actors to self-regulate in ways that reflect the norms of a community.”).
188. See Eichensehr, supra note 12, at 535.
189. Jurich, supra note 50, at 292 (“The inclusion of nonstate voices in the process allows for
the potential of a bottom-up lawmaking process that may identify and negotiate around factors that
private actors value.”).
190. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY
THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2010).
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The Danish government recently appointed an ambassador whose role is simply to
deal with powerful tech companies such as Facebook and Google.191
This calls into question a variety of other concerns deriving from the
illegitimacy of the tech sector’s endeavors. For example, what are the real interests
behind the rules and norms prescribed by the tech sector? What degree of
transparency should the tech sector provide when it creates, enforces, interprets,
and amends its own rules and norms? Is the tech sector at all accountable, and if so,
to whom?
2. Transparency
Transparency is often raised by scholars as one of the central values that tech
companies ought to embrace.192 The argument goes that if tech companies are
transparent in what, how, and why they do certain things, this may alleviate the
information gap between them and consumers. While the importance of
transparency in tech cannot be overstated, the obsession with transparency misses
the bigger picture, which is that tech companies simply want to govern. The desire
to govern is unlikely to disappear even if we achieve full transparency, because it is
rooted in a desire for power.
Janosik Herder, for example, suggests that we should look at tech companies
as “biopolitical companies.”193 These biopolitical companies want to “govern
populations” which:
puts them at odds with democratic states that were historically thought to
be the primary loci of biopower. Whereas the rise of platforms has
consistently been greeted with enthusiasm for their democratizing
potential, it may now be time to start to be concerned about the power
platforms wield and what their power means for democratic states.194
Transparency is important. The tech industry needs to be sincere about how
it comes up with its proposed rules and norm for cyberspace, but this sincerity does
not address the core issue that this Article focuses on: power. Or, more specifically,
how power over global cybersecurity regulation is inadvertently shifting from states
to tech companies.
3. Privacy
The ability of tech companies to regulate global cybersecurity raises various
privacy-related questions, such as, what sort of data will tech companies collect

191. Adam Taylor, Denmark Is Naming an Ambassador Who Will Just Deal with Increasingly
Powerful Tech Companies, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/04/denmark-is-naming-an-ambassador-who-will-just-deal-withincreasingly-powerful-tech-companies/ [ https://perma.cc/GYX2-WAD3 ].
192. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 187, at 1665 (“[T]here is very little transparency from these
private platforms.”).
193. Herder, supra note 4.
194. Id.
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while acting as the guardians of cyberspace? If an industry-led CRC is to be
established, how will it collect, use, and secure sensitive and valuable data? The
question of privacy is overlooked in the frameworks that tech companies attempt
to promote. There is a lot to gain from this unprecedented access to valuable data
globally. Tech companies have an incentive to use this data for commercial
purposes, as their cybersecurity mission also happens to be their business mission.
Whether tech companies can respect privacy and secure the confidentiality of
our personal information is a question of trust.195 Recent privacy violation scandals
involving Facebook and other tech companies had negative implications on the
trust that users are willing to afford to tech companies.196
Privacy is not only important for its inherent value, but also because tech
companies thrive on data and therefore have an incentive to collect and understand
as much of it as possible.197 Frank Pasquale observes that “platforms are now
leveraging data advantage into profits, and profits into further domination of
advertising markets. The dynamic is self-reinforcing: more data means providing
better, more targeted services, which in turn attracts a larger customer base, which
offers even more opportunities to collect data.”198 This may explain the incentive
that many tech companies have in participating in different regulatory regimes that
can enhance their access to consumer data.
4. Neutrality
Can tech companies truly be neutral vis-à-vis state governments? The
Cybersecurity Tech Accord contains a promise that the undersigned “will not help
governments launch cyberattacks against innocent citizens and enterprises from
anywhere.”199 As Kristen Eichensehr puts it, these tech companies “cast themselves
as neutrals amidst competing claims by national governments and in the face of
claims by the U.S. government for preferential treatment because of their status as
U.S. companies.”200 Andrew Woods explains that this sort of neutrality is more
strategic than ideological, and temporary rather than permanent.201
The San Bernardino terrorist attack, which culminated in a dispute between
the FBI and Apple as to the extent of assistance that Apple owed the FBI in its
195. ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 4 (2018) (“[B]ecause we share when we trust, I argue that we should start talking
about, thinking through, and operationalizing information privacy as a social norm based on trust.”).
196. Marietje Schaake, Beware of Tech Companies Playing Government, BLOOMBERG ( Jan. 16,
2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-17/beware-of-techcompanies-playing-government [ https://perma.cc/T9QV-S98R ] (“If we’ve learned anything from the
scandal after scandal over Facebook Inc’s handling of user data, it is that the private sector’s noble
intentions to regulate the internet should be met with skepticism. Without adequate public oversight of
algorithms, and with recurring bad practices, tech platforms cannot—should not—be trusted.”).
197. Pasquale, supra note 5, at 3.
198. Id.
199. A Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace, supra note 54.
200. Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 698.
201. Woods, supra note 111, at 5.
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investigation, illustrates the need for neutrality. Apple may have many reasons why
it cannot or would not help the FBI, but one of them should be that Apple will not
give U.S. authorities preferential treatment over any competing demands from other
state governments.202
The question remains whether this neutrality is aspirational or practical in
reality. U.S.-based companies are still subject to U.S. laws and regulations. Tech
companies who operate in other foreign markets are similarly subjected to local laws
and regulations applicable to their activity.203 It is therefore unclear whether this
neutrality can be achieved, and if so, at what price to law enforcement and other
state interests.
5. Parity
The last concern is that of parity, looking to the power dynamics between
states and tech companies. Kristen Eichensehr asks whether tech companies are
becoming on par with countries and says that, if this were the case, it would be
“potentially revolutionary.”204 Eichensehr then reviews the qualities that we tend to
associate with Westphalian sovereigns and concludes that, despite similarities to
states, companies have not achieved perfect parity.205 This conclusion is largely
based on the fact that tech companies lack territory,206 coercive power,207
recognition,208 and are still “subordinate to public authorities and legal regimes
within the states in which they operate.”209 Similarly, Andrew Woods argues that
tech companies pose no challenge to state sovereignty at all.210 According to Woods,
states can assert their sovereignty whenever tech companies push too far.211 These
views miss the bigger picture, and I respectfully disagree.
It is misguided to compare what tech companies are doing nowadays to the
concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which dates back to the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia. No one back then anticipated that private corporations would one day
become so powerful that their power would not even fall within the ideas of
sovereignty conceived at Westphalia. It is true that tech companies lack the
characteristics Eichensehr lays out, but it does not necessarily follow that they are
not on par with states.

202. See Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 698.
203. Id. at 699.
204. Id. at 685.
205. Id. at 694.
206. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a)
a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations
with the other states.”).
207. See Eichensehr, supra note 69, at 684.
208. Id. at 695.
209. Id.
210. Woods, supra note 111.
211. Id. at 6.
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However, despite tech companies’ power, they are not on an equal footing
with states because we should use different metrics of sovereignty for states and tech
companies. It is unlikely that tech companies will ever have independent territories
like states, but they will become increasingly powerful despite their aterritorial
nature. These tech companies own cyberspace “territories,” market shares, and
industry monopolies, which may be even more significant than physical territory in
the cybersecurity context. And while it is true that tech companies do not have a
monopoly on the use of force, they do often act in monopolistic ways in cyberspace
which states would not be able to. Finally, tech companies are indeed subject to the
laws and regulation in markets where they operate, but the ability of these markets
to reshape how tech companies operate globally is somewhat limited. Yes, nation Y
can pass legislation to restrict the user data that platform X can collect and use. But
nation Y cannot pass legislation that will change platform X’s business and policy
strategy throughout the entire world.212 This is a collective action problem of sorts.
The question of parity, therefore, is not whether tech companies are states or
whether they have territory. Rather, it is about tech companies becoming powerful
in their own unique way, which challenges the notions of power and coercion that
we typically associate with states. Tech companies do not have territories, armies,
or recognition as sovereign states, but their emerging power represents a new type
of sovereignty—digital rather than Westphalian. As Frank Pasquale has observed,
the tech companies’ increase in power represents a “shift from territorial to
functional sovereignty.”213
B. The Future of Privatized Tech Legislation
Privatized cybersecurity law represents a single instance of tech companies
assuming a role in regulating global cybersecurity. However, this is part of a broader
phenomenon that has implications for future platform-sponsored initiatives to
create law on tech-related matters.
The phenomenon of privatized cybersecurity law may herald a broader
phenomenon of privatized legislation, where tech companies engage in the creation
of norms and rules that would benefit their private interests. That does not
necessarily mean that Internet users or other consumers would suffer, but it signals
that lax government control of these initiatives will jeopardize the public law values
discussed infra.
This increase in privatization is reflected in Amazon and Microsoft’s recent
move to promote facial recognition legislation that “protects individual civil rights
and ensures that governments are transparent in their use of facial recognition
212. Sarah Marsh, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ on Google Only Applies in EU, Court Rule, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/24/victory-for-google-inlandmark-right-to-be-forgotten-case [ https://perma.cc/RN4E-VXXK ] (explaining when the
European Court of Justice held that while the right to be forgotten is part of data protection law in the
EU, it will only apply within the territory of the EU).
213. Pasquale, supra note 5, at 2.
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technology.”214 This does not necessarily suggest that tech companies will become
any more involved in shaping technology regulation than they have been in the past,
but rather that they will reframe their methodology. Instead of lobbying for a certain
agenda with legislators and regulators, tech companies will now independently offer
“norms,” “principles,” and “guidelines” for technologies that they themselves
develop. This will further blur the lines between government-sponsored legislation
and platform-created norms, which will frustrate challenges to or public oversight
of these norms.
In addition, the privatization of tech law, which is currently the creation of
mostly U.S.-based tech companies, will further exacerbate the current distrust
among governments who seek to leverage their cyber offense. These governments
may feel as if these corporate initiatives are hegemonic, under-representative, and
therefore illegitimate.215 These privatized laws could potentially be seen as
U.S.-sponsored norms that seek to imperialize global norms without going through
the proper international lawmaking processes.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates the tech industry’s growing involvement in creating
and promoting international norms and rules for global cybersecurity. While the
case studies in this Article focus on cybersecurity, this involvement is extending into
other areas of technology regulation, such as facial recognition, data privacy,
and more.
The tech industry is therefore assuming the informal role of global
cybersecurity legislator. This privatization of cybersecurity law is one example out
of many, reflecting the broader governmentalization of the private tech industry.
Other stakeholders ought to be responsive to this phenomenon in order to avoid
abuse by tech companies. As Yafit Lev-Aretz and I observed a few years ago, “if it
talks like a government and acts like a government, it must be a tech giant.”216
Tech companies are now using the normative vacuum left by states to step in
and promote their own vision of global cybersecurity norms. This involves not only
the promulgation of norms, but also the creation of institutions such as a Cyber Red
Cross. As this Article demonstrated, this privatization of cybersecurity law has
created some opportunities but also raised considerable issues that state
governments, civil society actors, and Internet users need to be cognizant of. While
214. Tom Simonite, Amazon Joins Microsoft’s Call for Rules on Facial Recognition, WIRED
(Feb. 7, 2019, 6:47 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-joins-microsofts-call-rules-facialrecognition/ [ https://perma.cc/Q5PK-HLKQ ].
215. See Hollis & Waxman, supra note 177, at 156 (explaining how the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which the authors consider a plausible model for global cybersecurity, was often perceived as
hegemonic and under-representative).
216. Ido Kilovaty & Yafit Lev-Aretz, If It Talks like a Government and Acts like a Government,
It
Must
Be
a
Tech
Giant,
TECHCRUNCH
(Mar.
31,
2017,
1:00
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/31/if-it-talks-like-a-government-and-acts-like-a-government-itmust-be-a-tech-giant/ [ https://perma.cc/5PT2-QW4E ].
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the tech industry has an important role to play in global cybersecurity, state
governments would be wise to curb the appetite for power that some of the major
tech companies currently have, so that values such as democratic legitimacy,
accountability, and transparency can be effectuated. This requires further global
efforts of creating authoritative norms through multi-stakeholder processes that
involve a diverse set of legitimate, accountable, and transparent actors
and ideologies. Tech companies should have a seat at the table, but they cannot be
allowed to restrict other stakeholders from participating in the norm-creation and
institution-building processes.

